Tuesday, 30 June 2009

Darrois--Clementi Comes to France?

I went along to a presentation by Jean-Michel Darrois on his commission's proposals to reform the French legal profession at the Law Society yesterday. It, of course, begs comparison with the Clementi Review in the UK.

Darrois prefaced his remarks by saying that President Sarkozy was concerned that French lawyers weren't as present in the world as US and UK lawyers. It seems that French lawyers, apart from a few big firms like Gide, are more inward looking.

Taking this to heart the commission was composed of few lawyers, a couple of professors, judges, administrators and one in house lawyer, although it heard evidence from a wide range of people.

The French legal profession is divided rather like English lawyers with turf wars constantly being fought. When notaries were about to get the power to grant mutual divorces, French lawyers (avocats) objected that they were being excluded--hence Darrois.

Part of the trouble with the French legal profession is the perception of what each part's role is. Notaries are seen as quasi-public officials who can do "authentic acts". (Apparently, according to Prof Aynes, learning what these are is the bane of French law students' studies.) Avocats can't do them. In fact, avocats are seen as court lawyers whose prime duty is to the client--a defender.

Others do law as well including accountants and legal advisers. But strangely in house counsel are not lawyers. They are merely employees of the company and don't enjoy lawyer-client confidentiality or secrecy. The French legal profession likes it this way.

Overall, the reforms proposed by Darrois are modest, when compared to Clementi's.
  • Some fee sharing between notaries and lawyers will be allowed, but merging the two arms of the profession won't happen.
  • French lawyers can become in house counsel, but without the normal privileges.
  • Forms of multidisciplinary practice (or more likely legal disciplinary practice) will be permitted, eg. lawyers and accountants (but not lawyers and auditors). These can be temporary, short term or permanent.
  • Law firm partnerships will be encouraged.
  • Legal aid will be properly introduced and funded.
  • Some form of joint legal training will be introduced so that law students will know what others in the legal profession do and can therefore make an informed choice.
Nicolas Sarkozy has said he will introduce the reforms next year.

Are they going to increase the presence of French lawyers in the world at large? Unlikely. At best this is a minor reconfiguration which brings the French legal profession into the early 20th century, but nowhere near the 21st century of Clementi and the Legal Services Act.

I can't see how the Darrois reforms are going to reduce the fragmentation of the French legal profession. One lawyer who spoke about the reforms expressed strong doubts. Another mentioned that being a notary in France still depended on nationality and therefore excluded UK notaries. (This is being heard by the ECJ.)

Even though Darrois kept lawyer participation on his commission to the minimum, they have won through. Of course, it's possible that if he had come up with radical Clementi-style proposals, Liberty would be raising her tricolor once more and we would have heard the screams from London.

The final conclusion to draw from this is that the French legal profession doesn't want to liberalize in the same way that the British have. Nor it seems do the Americans. At least the US recognizes the difficulties it faces. And at some point New York state will liberalize its own rules to cope with the pressures of globalization. The French haven't realized that globalization has already been in action for some time. They have a lot to catch up.

Thursday, 25 June 2009

Attracting Attention

We have been running our blog for a short time only but it is beginning to attract readers from around the world as the graphic from Sitemeter illustrates. The power of Web 2.0!


Philosophical Foundations of Law and Finance - 21sth Weekly Meeting

At the 21st meeting of the Philosophical Foundations of Law and Finance (Friday 26th June, from 6.00-8.00pm, in room 501, 309 Regent St) we shall read Aristotle discussing rhetoric and persuasion.

Joe will also present a framework for a corporate-centric finance view of epistemology-ontology. He will show how Aristotle's method could be applied to the knowledge of the world through the lens of finance; and use, yet again, concepts of risk symmetries for the clarification and understanding of the implications of stem cell technology on humanity (see Clive Cookson, "An Industry to Grow", FT, 25 June 2009 at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2fe059ae-60ed-11de-aa12-00144feabdc0.html). As Edmond Curtin says, "this is about harvesting humans and individual sovereignty". We can also imagine what "stem cell financial derivatives" might be. We need to get ahead of the curve on this because the curve is going to be a tsunami.

We shall seek more bubbles and rations at Vapiano thereafter

See you tomorrow

Joe and Laura

Tuesday, 23 June 2009

Civil Justice

I went to a seminar on the decline of civil justice today at University College London where it was argued that mediation is a cheap alternative to adjudication. Here's proof.

(Thanks New Yorker)


Thursday, 18 June 2009

Philosophical Foundations of Law and Finance - 20th Weekly Meeting

On Friday 19th June (from 6.00-8.00pm, in room 501, 309 Regent St), Westminster LLM student Arianna Consalvi will enlighten us on the ontological, epistemological and legal conundrums regarding the ‘Swap Contract’ in Italy – these inverted commas will be the erratic focus of investigation.

Please note that it will be nothing less than our 20th meeting. We shall celebrate the Philosophical Foundations of Law and Finance afterwards at Vapiano or at the movies.

See you then!



Wednesday, 17 June 2009

Straight There No Detours

Avis Whyte and I have just finished an article derived from the research we did for the Bar Council on direct access to clients. It can be downloaded here.

The Bar has been a referral profession for many years and now it is attempting to reconfigure itself towards direct dealings with clients. This has a serious impact on the manner in which the Bar constitutes itself as a profession.

Our conclusion reads:
Modernity unsettles professional certainties. For four centuries the Bar has enjoyed many privileges (Prest 1986) but there has been a hollowing out of its professional core as its reserved areas have come under threat. The gradual erosion of the referral aspects of barristers’ relationships with solicitors and others exposes barristers to the contingencies of the market in a raw form not usually experienced. The rising intervention of the state into the lawyer-client relationship through the control of the legal aid budget is accelerating these moves. These are moves to bureaucratic control and potential proletarianization (Larson 1977: 232). The Bar is losing its grip on its professional project. Or is it? Muzio and Ackroyd (2008: 49) argue we are not observing the end of professionalism but rather various defensive manoeuvres by professionals to maintain their privileges.

How does the rise in direct access work fit with the changes in the Bar? In part it has to do with what Boon and Levin (2008: 77) described as “The legal services market has a multitude of sites in which different norms proliferate.” Barristers occupy many positions outside traditional private practice. They are in business, government, the Crown Prosecution Service, and even inside solicitors’ firms. And when we add to the mix an increasing diversity of professional members in gender and ethnicity, common cultural values change and may not hold. This is reinforced by the division in work at the Bar between those who largely undertake publicly aided work and those who act for private clients. Barristers paid by the state operate under considerable control in terms of what they can do and what they can charge for their labour. No equivalent constraints fall on private client practitioners: they function within the market. Further controls are imposed by chambers arrangements which are becoming more corporate in focus. Chambers are increasingly specialized in their practice areas. They target potential lateral hires, including groups of practitioners, and establish business targets, all of which compromises the ethic of individuality espoused in the Bar.

Although the fusion of barristers and solicitors is unlikely to happen, the introduction of Legal Disciplinary Partnerships in 2009 has opened up the organization possibility for the conjoining of the two. And when alternative business structures make themselves known, many conventional arrangements might begin to fail. Alternative business structures will seriously affect numbers and structures within the legal profession and increase the employed section of the legal profession. We suggested that up to a thousand law firms could fail in competition with supermarkets and other legal service providers. Barristers too will be affected.

With these eventualities direct access work grants the possibility of holding onto traditional values and procedures. Prest (1986) is clear that the settling of the referral structure of the Bar did not come into being until the 19th century, so that an earlier paradigm of professionalism for the Bar encompassed direct relations with clients. Attorneys and solicitors stepped in when geography made it difficult for clients. Direct access recaptures these pre-modern ideals of working. But perhaps of more significance is that barristers can situate themselves more centrally in the market through doing direct access work. Their potential for control over their work and professional relationships is enhanced.


Graduate Conference Follow Up: First Amendment Opportunism

There is something deeply counterintuitive in constitutional rights claims such as freedom of speech that are rooted not in protection of private life, but in mitigating financial losses. The fact that businesses can invoke the First Amendment arguments is not in itself new. In late 70s, the First Amendment was used to protect economic liberty in cases of commercial speech and, more specifically, price advertisement. Frederick Schauer (2000) pointed out quite insightful that people and organizations with a wide array of goals use First Amendment argument when "find that society has not given them the doctrinally or rhetorically effective argumentative tools they need to advance their goals."

The unique problem associated with granting the First Amendment protection to market players and, more specifically, credit rating agencies, is their ability to argue that their function is merely to provide “opinions”. The credit rating agencies long maintained that their core business is financial publishing and, therefore, were generally shielded from liabilities under the securities law unless actual malice is demonstrated. The credit rating agencies had some success in persuading courts that their core activities constitute a matter of public concern and holding a credit rating agency liable for its bond ratings would have an oppressive effect on the publication of important financial information to the public.

My conference presentation illustrated the phenomenon with a series of court cases. Various courts have reached a range of results in cases filed against the rating agencies. Even though the rating business can be positioned as publishing of financial opinions, such a publisher can be held liable for malfeasance. Further, the securities law regulates commercial speech by providing for liability for false and misleading statements. Applicable to the credit rating business, the court have distinguished whether rating agencies were merely collecting and analyzing information or were playing a more significant role in the transaction thus can be qualified as agents of the issuer. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court has stated that it is difficult to see why the expression of opinion about a marketable security should not also be protected: credit rating agencies do not profit from the sale of the bonds of any company that they rate for creditworthiness and they perform an essential service for economy and efficiency of the capital markets.

In light of the on-going credit crisis fueled, in part, by poor performance of the credit ratings and heightened concerns regarding rating agencies independence, the courts are less likely to establish First Amendment protection of credit rating opinion. We can point out at least two reasons: (1) if a credit rating opinion is not disseminated to investment public at large, but only made available to a limited number of investors (i.e., private ratings) then such an opinion is less likely to qualify a "matter of public concern;" (2) if a credit rating opinion is published in regard to a security that was structured followed an instructive communication process between a rating agency's analysts and underwriters then such a process is less likely to qualify as merely publishing, but could be viewed by the courts as administering a professional advice. In addition, in foreign jurisdictions where the freedom of speech argument is less culturally accepted, credit rating agencies may have to use other argumentative tools to organize the defense.

Schauer, F., 2000, First Amendment Opportunism, KSG Working Paper No. 00-011


Tuesday, 16 June 2009

Russell's Paradox And Resolving Credit Crisis Contradictions

I wish to draw an analogy to the crisis of confidence caused by Bertrand Russell to the foundations of set theory in 1901 and the crisis of market and regulatory credibility of 2007-2008. This is not the normal route to draft parallels. Usually, for financial market academics, the analogy is drawn to historical periods of extreme market volatility and morbidity, e.g., Tulipmania, South Sea bubbles, other "extraordinary popular delusions and the madness of crowds" (Mackay 1841) with the extreme conclusion that bubbles are translationally symmetric over time. Such is the nature of our reality that we must accept the eternal recapitulation of stupid-stupid errors of judgment.

But the lack of confidence is not necessarily a stasis. The analogy is drawn to Russell's Paradox and its solution as a matter of generalization, freely floating over any one of a number of historical episodes. It may be the lack of confidence in both Bertie's time and our time spur solutions which may save the foundations of a non-contradictory epistemology and results in an accommodation that preserves our way of life.

The sketch of the argument (rather than the whole thing which is too technical for a blog) is that Russell's Paradox which appeared to destroy set theory with its innocent "R is a set whereby x is not an member of itself" leads to contradictions, and in a single swipe, Frege's attempt to define number and arithmetic based on set theory was utterly devastated. Wow! This was a crisis of confidence because the entire foundation of simple arithmetic was now contradictory. The Russell Paradox motivated Neuman then Bernays and Godel (NBG) to construct a solution based on a two-level classification of "proper classes" (really big collections) and "sets" (which are parts of classes). Now the Russell Paradox is resolved because it becomes a Russell class where x is a set and x is not a member of itself. Around 1908 Zermelo and then later Fraenkel developed another fix called ZF which allowed for only one concept of set and some simple operations like intersection, union and complementation. The ZF solution legislated sets via the simple operations and didn't allow for any proper classes. Sounds like Luhman to the Luhman lovers. A bit later when the dust settled, it was realized in ZF and NBG that no set is an element of itself and that ZF and NBG are equivalent solutions.

How does this little story of maths-logic relate to the credit crisis of 2007-08?

Camera One: the crisis of confidence set out by the Russell Paradox is that Bertie discovered that the foundations of a particular professional discourse were rotten to the core. In market terms, the players (both major market participants and regulators) were conflicted by wearing different hats as it suited them. The Goldman Sachs strategy is simply to buy government influence by having its fraternity occupy seats of power. The credit crisis which is said to be a breakdown of trust and confidence came when we could not swallow any more contradiction--we froze in terrorem when the investment banker wrote the regulations which no one understood (remember Hank Paulson, former CEO of Goldman Sachs, contradicting himself everytime he appeared on TV around Sep through Nov 2008? Lehman went bust on Sept 15, 2008).

Camera Two: to solve the credit crisis, we might take the ZBG route or the ZF route. The ZBG route is to metaphysicalize the market and say, "We (the government) are going to protect a much larger swath of the general public--whatever we say or do will be very very big--much bigger than that little set of troublesome subprime mortgage-backed securities. And in the name of saving the proper class of the entire world, we give you our radical solutions." Of course, these solutions are no different from the past since they can all be lumped into the category of "dictatorial discretion". The ZF route is to say, "We (the market) will continue to operationalize and stick to our simple chores of executing trades on behalf of governments, because all trades will now be part of the governments' debt."

Camera Three: the two "fixes" as it were under Camera Two result in the same (equivalent) reality because in a very strong sense the government and the market continue to game each other.

In the end, Bertie's Paradox resulted in an effloressence of logics. Could it be that the result of the credit crisis, contrary to the predicted constraints of economists, will be even more of the same market-government gamesmanship? This is not a quiet universe.

Reference: Goldblatt, R. (1984, 2006) Topoi, The Categorial Analysis of Logic, pp. 9-12.

Monday, 15 June 2009

So, who's really culpable here?

(Thanks to the New Yorker)

So, who's really culpable here?


Thursday, 11 June 2009

Philosophical Foundations of Law and Finance - 19th Weekly Meeting

At Friday's seminar on the Philosophical Foundations of Law and Finance (12th June, 6.00-8.00pm, Room 501, 309 Regent St) we shall turn to Aristotle's classic, The Art of Rhetoric.

If you have ever wanted to convince yourself of something or persuade others to do something, and ever wondered how is this to be done then Aristotle's work is the bees knees. Much of what we call common sense in the Western world comes from this incomparable book.

Book I: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.1.i.html

This is a big shift from Plato's approach. We are reaching into the dark arts of persuasive technology, verbal manipulation, white lies and getting what you want even if it is not exactly the Good.

We may test the theory straight afterwards at Vapiano.


Joe and Laura


Wednesday, 10 June 2009

Westminster Graduate Conference 2009

The School of Law,
University of Westminster,


The Westminster International Law & Theory Centre

The 2009 Westminster
Graduate Conference
The Limits of Law: Justice Politics Ethics

Friday, 12th of June, 2009

Room 358
University of Westminster
309, Regent Street, London W1B

Attendance if free but please reserve a seat by emailing Samantha King

The 2009 Westminster Graduate Conference

The Limits of Law: Justice Politics Ethics

The School of Law, University of Westminster and the Westminster International

Law & Theory Centre are pleased to welcome you to the Westminster Graduate Law and Politics Conference on “The Limits of Law: Justice Politics Ethics”. The conference aims to be a friendly, workshop-like gathering where graduate students present, discuss and challenge aspects of law, politics and theory in various subject areas.

The conference consists of four sessions dedicated to typical categories of law and justice analysed through unorthodox and critical perspectives. The first session in the morning explores concepts of human rights, intellectual property rights and environmental rights. The second session deals with the inclusion and exclusion of the subjects of law. After lunch, the spotlight falls onto international justice. Session three, enter courts and their role in tackling international and transnational offences. The last session indulges in force and its ‘legal’ effects.


Registration (8.45 - 9.00)

Session One (9.00 - 11.15)


Adriana Giunta, “The Right to the Environment or a ‘New’ Right to the Environment? Its Challenges and Opportunities” (University of Hull)
Viktoria Baklanova, “First Amendment Opportunism: Preserving the Freedom of Speech for Credit Rating Agencies” (University of Westminster)
Chikosa Banda, “Reforming the Patent System to Promote more R&D into Diseases of the Developing World: Limits of the Existing Approaches” (University of Cambridge)
Sharon Persaud, “‘Closed in an open sort of way:’ Luhmann and the border control of law” (Birckbeck College London)
Laura Niada, “The Human Right to Essential Medicines in sub-Saharan Africa: Contingency and Biopolitics” (University of Westminster)


Session Two (11.30 - 13.30)


Craig Reeves, “’Exploding the Limits of Law’: Judgment and Freedom in Arendt and Adorno” (King’s College London)
Margaret Fitzgerald, “The Usual Suspects: Analysing the Use of Past Criminal Convictions in the Justice System” (University College Cork, Ireland)
Amanda Machin, “Testing the Nation? Citizenship, Identification and Diversity” (University of Westminster)
Alan Desmond, “Justice Before Law: The Case for Regularisation of Undocumented Migrants in the EU” (University College Cork, Ireland)


Session Three (14.30 - 16.30)


Daniela Nadj, “The Limitation of International Law - The Overdetermination of Ethnicity and Marginalisation of Gender in ICTY Wartime Sexual Violence Jurisprudence” (University of Westminster)
Megan Ward, “Ivory Tower? Congolese Child Soldier Users and the International Criminal Court” (University of Essex)
Muhammad B. Ismail, “Diplomatic Immunities in Islamic and International Diplomatic Law” (University of Hull)
Fabian Zhilla, “Judicial Corruption and Organised Crime” (King’s College London)


Session Four (16.45 - 19.00)


Kristian Lasslett, “Foreign Policy as a Crime Facilitative System: Australia's 'Constructive Commitment' to the South Pacific and the Bougainville Conflict 1988-1990” (University of Westminster)
Hanum Mokhtar, “Reforming the Reluctant United Nations Legal Regime on the Use of Force: Breaking the Boulder Blocks” (King’s College London)
Liam D. Askins, “The Historical Development of the Law of Occupation” (University of Hull)
Masha Baraza, “Institutional Re/membering: Lessons for Kenya from the South African Experience” (University of Warwick)
Munir Nuseibah, “Law Vs Justice: Case Study of Israel’s Conduct in Jerusalem” (University of Westminster)


The Westminster International Law & Theory Centre

School of Law University of Westminster

The Westminster International Law & Theory Centre is dedicated to exploring theoretical strands in the study of law within an international/transnational context. The Centre develops and encourages further research and collaboration both at a national and international level through its Online Working Papers Series, which are double peer-reviewed and distributed through our website and SSRN; an initiative of internships that allow graduate students to get involved in organisational and steering matters of the centre; and through a successful series of public events, such as lectures, film shows, dialogues, symposia and workshops like the one in which you have kindly agreed to participate today. We have taken all possible measures so that your experience of the event will be fruitful and thought-provoking, and we hope to carry on our co-operation in the future.

For more information, please check

Forthcoming Events

Friday, 5th June, 9:00-18:00
Critical Environmental Law: A Workshop on the Limits of the Environment with Radha De Souza, Sharron A. FitzGerald, Pablo Ghetti, Mark Halsey, Jane Holder, Andreas Kotsakis, Bettina Lange, Karen Morrow, John Paterson, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Alain Pottage, Paul Street, Inger-Johanne Sand, The Boardroom, Regent Street, W1B

17th June, 13:00-14:30
Prof Gary Wickham (Murdoch)
The Role of ‘Society’ in the Law-Society Relation
Room 2.14, Little Titchfield St, W1W

2nd October, 17:00
Elizabeth Povinelli (Columbia) and Sarah Franklin (LSE) in conversation
Location tbc

To reserve a place please email Samantha King at S.King5@westminster.ac.uk

Contact Details

Conference Organisers

Laura Niada l.niada@my.westminster.ac.uk

Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos andreaspm@westminster.ac.uk

Centre Directors

Julia Chryssostalis J.Chryssostalis@westminster.ac.uk
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos

Centre Secretary

Samantha King S.King5@westminster.ac.uk

Conference Participants and Email

Liam D. Askins
Viktoria Baklanova
Chikosa Banda
Masha Baraza
Alan Desmond
Margaret Fitzgerald
Adriana Giunta
Muhammad B. Ismail
Kristian Lasslett
Amanda Machin
Hanum Mokhtar
Daniela Nadj
Laura Niada
Munir Nuseibah
Sharon Persaud
Craig Reeves
Megan A. Ward
Fabian Zhilla

Thursday, 4 June 2009

Lawyer-Client Relationships

Banker on Bishopsgate
(Darrell Berry)

I have just posted on SSRN the final revised version of my paper on lawyer-client relationships. It is "Ambiguous Allegiances in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: The Case of Bankers and Lawyers".

The paper deconstructs the prototypical dyadic lawyer-client relationship in the context of corporate transactions. Most lawyer-client analyses view the relationship as a direct unmediated one between the two. I argue this is illusory and that without understanding the context of business transactions, much about the relationship is omitted or missed from analysis.

At a minimum the relationship is triadic. If, for example, a client is borrowing funds from a bank for an investment, even though the client's lawyer's primary duty is to the client, the lawyer always has an eye on the future business that might come from the bank. The lawyer's allegiances are pulled more ways than one.

For example, Jonathan Knee in The Accidental Investment Banker: Inside the Decade That Transformed Wall Street (2006), wrote of one deal:
This episode highlights an important and inherent conflict between banker and client in sales processes. After a successful transaction, the client disappears and any future business will come from the universe of suitors. This creates a sometime irrestible incentive to provide, or give the appearance of providing, some form of subtle preferential treatment to those most likely to offer something in return at a later date.
The paper uses a mix of interview data, ethnography, and documentary sources. I would appreciate any comments and feedback.

Tuesday, 2 June 2009

Philosophical Foundations of Law and Finance - 18th Weekly Meeting

At the 18th weekly meeting of the Advanced Research Programme on the Philosophical Foundations of Law and Finance (Friday 5th June, 6.00-8.00pm, Room 501, 309 Regent St) we will enquire on oaths and ethos, sacrifice and beliefs.

Joe will discuss a little work by Joseph Henrich. Henrich has worked out an ‘equation’ for sacrifice (costly behaviour) as increasing the probability of sincerity. Thus, there is a difference between the Harvard MBA oath to not do anything unethical (see New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/business/30oath.html?em) and a saint's or prophet's vow of poverty or chastity. This is putting their money where their mouth is. ("Suffering for your beliefs makes others believe too", see New Scientist, 30 May 2009, at 9, http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20227103.800-religions-owe-their-success-to-suffering-martyrs.html).

See you there!



PhD - From Enrolment to Successful Viva

This week I have been asked to complete my annual progress reports for my PhD students. Last week I saw one of my PhD students successfully defend his thesis at a very scintillating viva voce. Next week I shall be examining a PhD thesis at the University of Essex. All this makes me reflect on what makes a successful PhD student. From my experience, first, there has to be an appropriate research question – this is an issue many doctrinal researchers could well fall prey to. I have examined many a thesis where there is simply no research question. The PhD student has simply described the state of the law – be it, the law on electronic bills of lading in Nigeria to some fine exception in the law of cheques. There is no discovery to be made and no theoretical question to be tested. This is where perhaps the empirical or jurisprudence researcher is usually so much better at – it seems to me that their disciplines much more readily lend themselves to a clear delineation of the research question. Secondly, a manageable methodology. It really goes without saying that a research without an appropriate methodology is like cooking a fancy meal for the first time without a recipe. Thirdly, a constructive relationship with the supervisor. The researcher certainly deserves much autonomy in the research process and experience, but without constructive criticism and discussion with his or her supervisor, the work is not properly tested and is much more likely to collapse during examination. Fourthly, the right motivation. I have interviewed more PhD applicants than I care to remember who have no idea what they want to research and are “quite happy to do whatever I suggest”. A refrain, in bad syntax, I hear often is “Can you please suggest me a topic?”. To me, these students simply have no idea what the PhD is about. Lastly, the commitment and determination to complete the thesis. The going will get hard and it takes sheer determination and much support from peers, friends and family to see oneself to the “bitter” end. However, I feel compelled to add that whilst confidence is a good thing, over-confidence is a dangerous trap. Humility as to the depth and wealth of expertise out there help tremendously to appreciate the amount of work needed to produce a good thesis.

In all this, the research environment in any law school is exceedingly important. It is in that environment that the student will learn from his or her supervisors, college and peers. Here at the University of Westminster I think we provide much support for the student to succeed. For this I feel very proud.


Monday, 1 June 2009

Advanced Legal Studies @ Westminster


This new blog will be written by the members of the Department of Advanced Legal Studies (DALS) in the School of Law at the University of Westminster. I apologize for the mouthful but I won't need to say it again.

DALS teaches the postgraduate/graduate courses in the law school as well as admitting research students for PhDs. 

All our members are research active and were submitted in the RAE2008. We cover a wide variety of research interests from empirical studies of law to more doctrinal approaches. We will discuss these in later posts.

You can contact me at johnflood@gmx.com.